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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH_. 
Plaintiff and Respondent lr 
DELBERT ::TERS, i 
Defendant and Appellant J 
GA~E- NO. 7 812 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties are designated as they 
were in t~e trial court. The defendant} 
Delbert Waters~ was charged by informa-
tion filed in the District Court for 
Sevier County ~tate •f Utah, with the 
crime 8f aseault with intent to rape, as 
follows: 
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"D elbert Waters, having heretofore 
to-wit, on the 29th day of August, 
1951, by G.W. Coons Esq., Justice 
of the Peace of Richfield Precinct 
Sevier County, State of Utah, sit-
ting as a Committing Magistrate , 
been duly bound over to answer 
this chargej is accused by J. Ver-
non Erickson) District Attorn~y 
for the Sixth Judicial District of 
the State of Utahj of the crime of 
assault with intent to commit rape 
and said ~istrict Attorney charges 
that on tne 1st day of August 
1951 at Sigurd, County of Sevier, 
State of Utah 5 the said- »elbert 
Waters, did wilfully, unlawfully, 
feloniously violently and forcib-
ly make an assault upon one Carol 
Lipsey,a female not then and there 
the wife of said Delbert Waters 
and with intent then and there 
feloniously and by force and vio-
lence, to carnally know and ravish 
the said Carol Lipsey and accomp-
lish with her an act of sexual in-
tercourse, against her will and 
without her consent. contrary to 
the form of the statute in such 
case made and provided,and against 
the peace and dignity of the State 
of Utah " 
On the 11th day of September;. 1951, 
defendant was arraigned before Honorable 
John L Sevy, Jr. Judge of the District 
Court of Sevier County, State of Utah. 
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The defendant entered a plea of not guil-
ty to the charge. The case came on for 
hearing before the Honorable John L. 
Sevy, Jr. on the 18th day of September, 
1951, who heard the case without a jury~ 
a jury being expressly waived by the de-
fendant. The opening statement by the 
State was waived by District Attorney J. 
Vernon Erickson. 
The State presented its evidence 
and rested. the defendant at this time 
moved to have the case dismissed on the 
ground that the State had failed to sus-
tain its burden and" had not 
sufficient evidence to support 
produce d 
the is-
sues raised by the information. The mo-
tion was denied. The defendant then 
rested and submitted the case upon the 
evidence adduced by the State~ no fur-
ther evidence bein~ put into the record 
and the State waiving its right to make 
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a closing statement. 
On the 19th day of September, 1951, 
the Honorable John L. Sevy, Jr. announ-
ced the verdict of the court was the de-
fendant was guilty as charged. There -
after on the 24th day of September and 
before the judgment and sentence of the 
court had been pronounced, the defendant 
filed a motion for arrest of judgment 
against him on the ground that the in-
formation filed by the State and the con-
duct of the State during the course of 
the trial did not apprise the defendant 
of the particul~crime w4th which he 
was charged. That during the process of 
the trial two separate offenses of the 
same hature were attempted to be shown . 
The State did not elect to prosecute one 
offense or the other. Each offense was 
argued before the Court and the defen-
dant was found guilty of the charge made 
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in the information. No finding was made 
as to the separae offenses. The defend-
ant was thereby tried without having re91. 
given proper notice and was prejudiced 
in that he was unable to make a proper 
defense Defendant is further prejudiced 
because he is unable to determine from 
the record which alleged offense he was 
found guilty of committing. The motion 
was also based on the ground that the 
facts proved did not constitute the pub-
lic offense of which he '"as found guil i{y. 
The motion was denied and the defendant 
was sentenced to be imprisoned in the 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term of not less than one or more than 
ten years The defendant after judgment 
and sentence had been pronounced~ filed 
a motion for a new trial on the groun d 
that the decision was contrary to the 
evidence adduced during the course of 
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the trial and that the evidence was to-
~lly insufficient to justify the ver-
dict and decision of the court. The mo-
tion was denied. Thereafter, the defen-
dant appealed to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is very little dispute as to 
the facts in this case. The defendant 
did not take the witness stand to con-
trovert any of the facts elicited from 
the State's witnesses and no witnesses 
were called in the defendant's behalf. 
The defendant~ Delbert Waters; met 
his friend Garry Dickinson, who was then 
16 years of age at about 8:30 p.m. on 
the evening of July 31, 1951, at Garry 
Dickinson's home in Richfield. Delbert 
Waters was driving a car he had borrowed 
from his brother. The boys decided to 
go in the car and get drunk. (Tr. 22) 
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Delbert Waters had been drinking before 
he met Garry. Garry Dickinson testified 
that he thought Delbert had had quite a 
bit to drink by that time. While toge-
ther, the boys drank beer which had been 
purchased by Delbert Waters at Jorgen-
son s Cafe in Salina Utah. (Tr. 23) 
Garry Dickinson estimated that they 
drank about 3 cans of beer each before 
they decided to go the home of Carol 
Lipsey, the complaining v-ri tness, which 
was in Sigurd, Utah (Tr. 23). 
The testimony of Carol Lipsey was 
that af the time of the alleged offense 
she was 15 years of age (Tr. 3) and she 
was spending the night of July 31st and 
August 1_9 1951: at home alone. Her par-
ents were in Yellowstone National Park 
(Tr. 5) and her sister was spending the 
night with her Aunt and Uncle. ( Tr. 6) 
s·ne :said that she had gone to bed and 
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had been in bed for a short time when 
Garry Dickinson opened the door to her 
room and came in. He turned on the light 
and asked if Eleith was there. Carol 
Lipsey answered "No" and asked what made 
him think she would be there. He said 
"I thought she was goinf to stay here. " 
(Tr. 6) Carol said she then checked the 
time and it was 12:20 a.m. (Tr. 6). She 
said it was "kinda late to go and see 
Eleith, wasn't it?" Garry said "O.K." 
and went out turning off the lights and 
closing the door. ( Tr. 6). 
A short time later Garry Dickinson 
returned with the defendant, Delbert 
W ters. They went into the bedroom and 
turned on the light. Carol Lipsey was 
clothed in only her brassiere and pants 
and said that she could not get out of 
bed because she had so little on. (Tr. 7) 
The defendant and Garry said they had 
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decided to come in and talk to her. The 
boys talked to her for some time con-
tinuing to drink beer in her presence, 
(Tr. 9) Garry Dickinson went to use the 
telephone and left Delbert Waters and 
Carol Lipsey alone in the bedroom toge-
ther. Delbert went over to the bed and 
started patting C-rol on the head and he 
called her "blondie." She testified 
that she then shoved him away from her . 
(Tr. 7) Delbert requested C-rol Lipsey 
to call a girl for him, 
housecoat and went to 
so she put on a 
the telephone. 
(Tr 7-8) The girl Miss Lipsey called 
was in bed and did not come to the tele-
phone. (Tr. 8) Delbert Waters again 
started patting Miss Lipsey on the head 
and called her "blondie." She ran into 
the bedroom and he followed her. He put 
his arms around her and pushed her onto 
the bed. Carol Lipsey called to Garry 
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Dickinson and he came into the bedroom 
and "took hold" of Delbert and said 
"come on, let's go." (Tr. 27) Delbert 
got up and went into the other room and 
sat down on the couch. He then said 
"Let s not go now. " ( Tr. 27) A short 
time later Delbert Waters did leave the 
house with Ga~ry Dickinson. (Tr. 28) 
The record s.hows that at the time he 
pushed Miss Lipsey down on the bed he 
was fully clothed and at no time did he 
attempt to undress or expose himself in 
any manner. (Tr. 27). 
Garry Dickinson testified that he 
and Delbert Waters drove to S-lina. Utah 
and that they continued to drink beer. 
He estimated that Delbert drank approxi-
mately 8 cans of beer while the two boys 
were together. (Tr. 32) When the boys 
left Salina and started back for Sigurd_. 
Delbert Waters was driving the car. The 
10 
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effects of his drink::lng showed in his 
driving and Garry Dickinson offered to 
drive the car. (Tr. 32) Garry Dickin-
son said that Delbe~t Waters stopped in 
front of the Cirol Lipsey home and got 
out of the car. When he got out of the 
car he staggered and Garry thought he 
was "quite drunkn at that time. (Tr.33 ) 
Carol Lipsey testified that after 
the boys left her place she went back to 
bed and went to sleep. Some time later 
she was awakened and Delbert Waters was 
in bed with her. (Tr. 10) He had both 
arms around her. (Tr. 10) She had her 
back to him. (Tr. 16) Delbert Waters 
was attempting to feel her person; he 
attempted to feel her chest and she tes-
tified that she grabbed his hands, moved 
them and held them for some time. He 
later moved his hands down and attempted 
to remove her pants. He pulled on them 
11 
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• 
but at no time offered to tear them from 
her person. (Tr. 17) She testified 
that he had his "thing" out and tried to 
put it between her legs .(Tr. 11) but she 
took hold of his hands and held them. 
He then held her cround the waist 
and went to sleep. (Tr. 11) The record 
shows that Delbert Waters was a man of 
considerable strength and had been mak-
in~ his livelihood by cutting and haul -
in~ cedar posts and pine poles from the 
hills which is hard physical labor. He 
could carry posts and poles of consider-
able weight and load them on the truck . 
It w s estimated that some of the posts 
he carried were up to 120 pounds in 
weight. Garry Dickinson testified that 
he himself could not carry and load 
posts of such size. (Tr. 30-31) Miss 
Lipsey on cross examination admitted 
that she did not have the strength to 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
overpower him. (Tr. 17) 
After Delbert w~ters went to sleep> 
Carol Lipsey slipped out of bed and went 
into the bathroom. She then left the 
house and ran to the home of her Aunt 
and Uncle. (Tr. 11) The Aunt and Uncle 
came back to Carol Lipsey's home and up-
on finding Delbert Waters still asleep 
Carol Lipsey's Uncle> Willis D. Allred, 
called Charles Carter the Sigurd Town 
Marshall~ who came to the Lipsey house. 
Nr. Carter went into the bedroom where 
Delbert Waters was sleeping and upon 
discovering that he was still asleep, he 
left him there and went to the telephone 
and called the Sevier County Sheriff 
Clarence Smith. Sheriff Smith came to 
the house shortly thereafter and talked 
to Delbert Waters and pulled him off the 
bed thereby awakeni~g him. (Tr. 34-36) 
The Sheriff then took belbert Waters to 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'*' 
the Sevier County Jail at Richfield and 
incarcerated him. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
THE F mDING OF THE COURT 
TRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF 
DENCE AND WAS UNSUPPORTED BY 
DENCE. 
WAS CON-
THE EVI-
THE EVI-
Rape as defined by our statute 103-
51 15 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is an 
act of sexual intercourse accomplished 
with a female not the wife of the per-
petrator,under any of the following cir-
cumstances: 
1. When the female is under the age of 
thirteen years. 
2. When she is incapable, through lun-
acy or any other unsoundness of 
mind whether temporary or perma-
nent, of giving legal amsent. 
3. Where she resists, but her resis-
tance is overcome by force or vio-
lence. 
4. Where she is prevented from resist-
ing by threats of immediate and 
great bodily ha~m accompanied by 
apparent power of execution, or by 
any intoxicating> narcotic or ana~ 
14 
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s. 
6. 
thetic substance administered by or 
with the privity of the accused. 
When she is at the time unconscious 
of the nature of the act and this 
is known to the accused. 
Where she submits under the belief 
that the person committing the act 
is her husband;. and this belief is 
induced by any artifice, pretense 
or concealment practiced by the ac-
cused with intent to induce such 
belief. 
The facts of this case restrict us 
to a consideration of whether the defen-
dant assaulted Carol Lipsey with intent 
to commit rape by force and violence and 
by overcoming her resistance. "In order 
to warrant a conviction of the crime of 
assault with intent to commit rape, the 
State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt every essential eleffient of rape 
except the final consummation of the act. 
It must be shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant Made an assault 
upon the female~ with intent to use such 
force as was necessary in order to have 
15 
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sexual intercourse with her aga1nst her 
will and without her consent." State v. 
Anderson (Utah) 257 P. 370. The intent 
to rape is the very gist of the offense, 
it cannot be assumed. It is the pos :1:--
-tion of the appellant that the State has 
failed to show evidence from which an 
intent to commit rape can reasonably be 
found. An examination of the facts in 
this case tends to negative such intent 
rather than to sustain it. 
The record shows that the first 
time Delbert was at the home of Carol 
Lipsey on the morning of August 1~ 1951, 
he was at no time in the house with her 
alone. He came to the house with Garry 
Dickinson a friend of Carol Lipsey, and 
Garry Dickinson was present ih the house 
though not always in the same room. The 
boys had gDne into the bedroom where 
Carol Lipsey was sleepin~ and had talked 
16 
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to her for some time. While Garry Dick 
inson was in another room using the tel-
ephone, it is show·n that the defendant 
went over to Miss Lipsey, who was still 
in bed. and patted her on the head and 
called her "blondie." Carol Lipsey 
shoved him away. He then asked Carol 
Lipsey to call Ann Gurr, a young girl 
living in Sigurd, Utah, for him. She 
agreed to do this and put on a housecoat 
and went to the telephone. After the 
call was made and it was learned that 
Ann Gurr was in bed, Delbert Waters a-
gain patted Carol Lipsey on the head and 
called her "blondie." She then ran into 
the bedroom. Delbert Waters followed 
and caught her ~nd put his arms around 
her and pushed her onto the bed. He was 
at this time fully clothed and at no 
time did he expose his body or private 
parts. He did nothi:lg to disrobe Miss 
17 
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Lipsey. He at no time threatened her, 
struck her or attempted to remove or 
tear her clothing from her person. The 
evidence taken in the worst light against 
the defendant may support the idea that 
he did desire to have intercourse with 
Miss Lipsey if he could have gained her 
consent but this evidence is so equivo-
cal that this may not be a fair infer-
ence to draw from it. After Delbert 
Waters had pushed Carol Lipsey onto the 
bed she called Garry Dickinson. He came 
into the bedroom and took hold of Del-
bert Waters and said ''Come on, let's go.,, 
(Tr. 27) Delbert got up> went into ano-
ther room and sat down on the couch. He 
then left the house with Garry Dickinson 
shortly thereafter. Miss Carol Lipsey 
then remained in the house alone and 
went back to bed and to sleep, which 
tends to show that she did not take a 
18 
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... 
too serious view of the events that had 
taken place. 
Delbert W1ters and Garry Dickinson 
left Carol Lipsey in Sigurd and drove to 
SJ.lina;, Utah. Delbert Waters had been 
doing a great deal of drinking and he, 
along with Garry Dickinson. continued to 
drink. Garry Dickinson one of the 
State's witnesses, said that Delbert Wa-
ters had had "quite a bit to drink" when 
he came to Garry's home early i n the 
evening and that he estimated that while 
he and.the defendant were together, Del-
bert Waters drank about eight cans of 
beer. When they returned from Salina to 
Sigurd the defendant was driving the car 
a~d the effects of his drinking showed 
in his driving to such an extent that 
Garry Dickinson offered to drive. When 
Delbert Waters stopped the car in front 
of Carol Lipsey's home, he staggered as 
19 
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he walked toward the house. 
Delbert Witers walked into the 
house and into Carol Lipsey s bedroom. 
Takinr Miss Lipsey's testimony at full 
value. he got into bed with her and put 
his arms around her. She was in bed 
with her back to the defendant. He at 
first started to feel her person. He 
moved his hands to her chest. She·grab-
bed his hands and was able to move them 
down to her waist and then was able to 
hold them for some time. He freed his 
hands and moved them down to the lower 
regions of her body. He started to re-
move her pants and when she resisted 
this action he placed his hands under 
them. C rol Lipsey testified that she 
could a::!.so :feel his "thing" and that he 
had tr.:.ed to put it bet·\tveen her legs. 
She said that she then "took hold of his 
hands and held them just as tight as I 
20 
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could." (Tr. 11) Delbert Waters then 
held her around her waist 
time and went to sleep. 
got out of bed_ leaving 
asleep upon the bed. 
for a short 
Carol Lipsey 
the defendant 
Delbert Waters had a considerable 
amount to drink during the evening of 
July 31, 1951 and the morning of August 
l> 1951 and the testimony shows that he 
was feeling the effects of the alcohol 
he had consumed. The fact that he was 
under the influence of alcohol tends to 
explain some of the strange circumstance 
in this case and it also tends to nega-
tive the necessary criminal intent re-
quired for a conviction in this case. 
Carol Lipsey was home alone on the 
morning of August 1~ 1951. No other per-
son besides the defend::tnt was in the 
house. Her parents were in Yellowstone 
National Park and her sister was staying 
21 
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with her Aunt and Uncle for the night. 
This being the case there was nothing to 
stop the defendant from raping C'rol 
Lipsey on the morning of August 1, 1951, 
had that been his intention when he re -
turned from Salina and went into her 
bedroom. The State•s evidence shows that 
Miss Carol Lipsey a 15 year old girl , 
was able to control the defendant's 
hands when he attempted to feel her per-
son. When Delbert Waters started to 
feel her lower person and to remove her 
pants she offered resistance by "taking 
hold of his hands ~nd holding them tigh." 
He then held her around the waist and 
went to sleep. Delbert Waters could not 
have intended to rape Carol Lipsey or he 
would have done so. The record shows 
that Carol Lipsey lt'ras able to control 
the defendant in spite of t~e great dif~ 
ference in the physical strength of the 
22 
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two parties. Carol Lipsey was a young 
15 year old girl who admits that she 
would not have the strength to overpower 
the defendant. (Tr. 17) Delbert Waters 
is shown to be a young man of considera-
ble strength. He had been making his 
living for a period of months before the 
time of this alleged offence by cutting 
and hauling cedar posts and pine poles 
from the mountains. It is sho"'J'n that he 
could carry posts of considerable weigh~ 
some of the posts were estimated to have 
a weight of 120 pounds, to a truck and 
load them on it. (Tr. 31) Garry Dick-
inson had been working with the defen-
dant for a period of over a month prior 
t~ the date of this alleged offense and 
he test~fied that Delbert W ters could 
carry o.nd load posts he t~s unable to 
handle. (~r. 31) 
It should be noted that the defen-
23 
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dant did no overt acts which would point 
unequivocally to an "intent to rape." He 
at no time ·said he was going to have in-
tercourse or even suggested that he de -
sired to intercourse with Carol 
Lipsey. He made no concerted effort to 
overpower her resistance, in fact~ when 
his advances were resisted he stopped 
his activity and went to sleep. It 
should again be noted that at the time 
Delbert Waters got into bed with Carol 
Lipsey, she was the only person in the 
house and there was no one to interfere 
or prevent the raping of Carol Lipsey 
had that been the defendant's intention. 
Only one conclusion can be reached under 
the circumstances and that is that Del -
bert Wcters did not intend to rape Carol 
Lipsey. This conclusion is strengthened 
and supported by a brief review of the 
a1~ thori ties on the crime of assault with 
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... 
intent to rape. 
In the leading Utah case of state v. 
Whittinghill,l63 P. 2d 342 the appellant 
had been convicted in the court below of 
the crime of assault with intent to rape. 
In reversing the decision of the trial 
court this Court said: 
"The facts in this case restrict us 
to the consideration of whether the 
defendant assaulted the prosecutrix 
with intent to commit rape by force 
and violence and by overcoming her 
resistance. An assault with intent 
to commit rape includes every ele -
ment of the crime of rape except 
that the act of intercourse is not 
committed. The felonious intent is 
the essence of the offence. It is 
elementary, when a specific intent 
is required to make an act an of-
fense~ that the doing of the act 
does not raise a presumption that 
it was done with the specifie in-
tent." Cap v. State, 61 Okl. Cr. 
173J 66 P.2d 959~ at page 963; Hall 
v. State 67 Okl. Cr. 330, 93 P.2d 
1107; Kitchen v. State, 66 Okl. Cr. 
4235 92 P.2d 860. 
"We think the fact, viewed most 
favorable for the prosecution! are 
not sufficient to constitute the 
crime of an assault with intent to 
commit rape. This court in State 
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~v. McCune, 16 Utah 170 .. 51 P. 818 
held as stated in the syllabi: 'In 
cases of assault with intent to co~ 
mit rape, the intent with which the 
assault is made is of the essence 
of the offense; and, in order to 
convict. the jury must be satisfied, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, not only 
that the defendant had the abi ity 
and intended to gratify his passiaE 
on the person of the woman assault-
ed. but that he intended to do so 
at all events, and notwithstanding 
any resistance on her part.' 
"When the intent is the gist of the 
offense.that intent should be shown 
by such evidence as, uncontradicted, 
will fairly authorize it to be pre-
sumed beyond a reasonable doubt. 
11 In Hall v. State, supra, the court 
recited the evidence of the case in 
detail. The facts supporting in -
tent are, we think, stronger than 
in the case at bar. The Oklahoma 
Court held the evidence was insuf -
fic~ent and reversed the judgment 
with directions to dismiss. In 
Kitchen v. State supra~ the court 
says: 'The intent is the gist of 
the offense and every laying of 
hands on the female ~nder the age 
of consent, even though improper 
does not necessarily imply an in-
tent to have sexual intercourse • 
Ir;_decent liberties may be taken 
with a child without any s1;ch in-
tent. The statute recognizes this 
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·. ~~M pli'o1lidiP~ ~\ p~nal ty for taking 
indecent liberties with a female 
child without intent to commit the 
crime of rape. ' 
"See State v. Mortensen, 95 Utah 
541, 83 P. 2d 261. And likewise in 
the case now before us the fact 
that the accused in court admitted 
that it was his intention to have 
sexual intercourse with the prose-
cutrix and that he put his hands on 
her is not evidence that will~ of 
itself support the criminal intent 
required for conviction of assault 
with intent to rape, for such evi-
dence will support a contention 
that the accused did the acts for 
t ~:~t.h~opurpose· ... of::-arous!ttng~:- the ;_pass iaB 
of the prosecutriX expecting her to 
submit to intercourse, just as well 
as a criminal intent to commit ra~. 
"Specific intent may be inferred 
from acts. It may be shown like 
other facts from surrounding cir-
cumstances. The circumstances when 
taken together must admit of no 
other reasonable hypothesis than 
that of guilt to warrant convicticn. 
Kitchen v. State, supra. 
"The case of State v. Hennessy 73 
Mont. 20, 234 P. 1094, 1096, ~hen::. 
considered with the case at bar is 
both interesting and enlightening. 
The facts of the case are much 
stronger in support of criminal in-
tent to commit rape than those now 
before us. The Montana Court held: 
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'We credit every physical act of 
the defendant as detailed by the 
prosecutrix with the full force of 
every reasonable deduction or:;.·iti.'R 
ference, or deduction which in our 
judgment will sustain the conten -
tion of the State that the defen-
dant at any time entertaindd the 
intention to overcome the physical 
resistance of the prosecutrix and 
have sexual intercourse with her 
without her consent. Accepting her 
story as true, she was, of course, 
offended assaulted, and aggrava-
tingly insulted. From her testi -
mony; if truej we must conclude 
that the defendant desired to have 
sexual intercourse with herj and as 
said in Commonwealth v. Merril, su-
pra (14 Gray, Mass., 415, 77 Am. 
Dec. 336). 'There is ample proof of 
gross indecency and lewdness and 
simple assault. However, such facts 
alone do not constitute an attempt 
to commit the crime of rape. They 
will support a charge of assault of 
an aggravated character and, as to 
this. the State was not without an 
ample remedy, and available and ad-
equate statutory provision for pun-
ishment in the event of a convic-
tion. The defendant's conduct, as 
detailed by the prosecutrix, was 
reprehensible the more so because 
of his station 1n life) and may not 
be justified or approved in morals 
or law.' 
"There is no evidence that the de -
fendant said he was going to rape 
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the prosecutrix or have intercourse 
with her against her will. The ac-
cused never threatened the lady) 
never struck her~ nor tore her 
clothing from her person. What he 
did supports the contention that he 
was attempting to gain her consent 
and not to overcome any mental or 
physical resistance by force. The 
acts of the )rosecutrix as they 
left the scene of the assault do 
not support any claim of such crim-
inal intent. We think the record 
fails to establish the criminal in-
tent required for a conviction. The 
accused was guilty of attempted im-
morality and by prejudice was con -
victed of a heinous offense which 
the record does not warrant. 
!'If the accused at the time he first 
unlawfully placed his hands upon 
the prosecutrix had the intention 
of raping her why did he fail to 
do more than he did? The lust 
--: ~: ~'t-'rn1lch•-1n-1~:Pesses {'":the m'ind'· wi:t.h in-
tent to rape and causes one to com-
mit a criminal assault is not mild, 
neither easily diverted nor dissi -
pated except by unforeseen forces 
or unexpected interference. Sexual 
passion so violent as to create the 
criminal intent to rape is not des-
troyed or diverted by mild resis-
tance, uncleanliness or ordinary 
evidence of the menstrual period." 
"The strongest case that can be 
made against the accused is that he 
assaulted the prosecutrix with in-
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tent to have sexual intercourseJbut 
this intent was vacated when she 
resisted and he discovered she was 
unwell. We believe evidence of 
criminal intent to warrant submis-
sion of the facts fo a jury on a 
charge of assault with intent to 
commit rape must be much stronger 
and far more fixed ··and convincing 
than established by the most favor-
able evidence presented in this 
case." 
Clearly the facts of the present 
case will nare:! .. snbstantil&te.~·-convictiori ·of 
the defendant under the law as it exists 
in the State of Utah. The Defendant 
used no form of force or coercion upon 
Miss Carol Lipsey to force her to submit 
to sexual intercourse with him against' 
her will. In fact the defendant stopped 
feeling Carol Lipsey's person when she 
did offer some serious resistance to hE 
He then relaxed and went to sleep. There 
was at that time nothing to prevent the 
crime of rape upon the person of Carol 
Lips2y had the defendant intended to do 
so. But instead of committing the crime 
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of rape he went to sleep and continued 
to sleep in her bed under these strange 
conditions while she left the house and 
got her Uncle and Aunt. He continued to 
sleep while the Sheriff was called and 
he was still asleep when the Sheriff 
came and took him into custody. 
The actions of the defendant cannot 
be explained by saying that he intende d 
to rape Carol Lipsey. Such an explana-
tion is beyond common reason and its 
falacy is shown by these simple ques-
tions: Why, under the circumstances ~ 
did not Delbert Waters rape C rol Lip-
sey? Why would he go to sleep and allow 
her to leave the house and go for help 
while he remained in her bed under such 
precarious circumstances? 
The Califorhia case of People v. 
Muller., 114 P. 2d 11~ follows the Utah 
holdings and also adds support to the 
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contention of the appellant that the 
evidence was insufficient to justify a 
conviction. The Court uses the follow-
ing language: 
"A man is guilty of rape by .c-~orce 
and \?iolence when he has carnal 
knowledge of a woman forcibly and 
against her will. When the man em-
ploys force with intent to effect 
an act of copulation against her 
will notwithstanding her resistance 
he thereby commits an assault with 
intent to rape provided that his 
intent is coupled with the present 
means of accomplishing his purpose. 
52 C.J. 1026. If penetration be 
accomplished, it is rape; if not, 
is the crime of assault with intent 
to rape by force. Whatever the ex-
tent and however rough the fondling 
of the woman~ if her pursuer with -
out fear of interruption voluntari-
ly abandon8 hjs endeavor to ravish 
her sexual organsj then the force 
he employed was not an assault with 
intent to co~~it rape. The mere 
fact that he is garbed in the vest-
ments of the male and displays the 
gestures of such is not sufficient 
to establish an intent upon his 
part to effectuate his sea~al de-
sire against any opposition of the 
\'Toman. The persuasions j caresses 
and embraces of the seducer are not 
evidences of a felonious intent. 
The man may generously employ all 
tl&se arts with force, hoping to 
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persuade, and yet finally abandon 
his prey. In such an event he were 
guilty of nothing more than simple 
battery. 
"The finding of intent to commit 
rape is the s:tne qua non of a judg-
ment of guilty of assault with in -
tent to commit rape, i.e., to be-
foul the body of a woman against 
any physical opposition she might 
offer. Unless the defendant indi-
cated a resolution to use all his 
force to commit rape, then there is 
no satisfactory proof of such in-
tent. Nothing points to such fixed 
purpose. She was small and illy e-
quipped to cope with so formidable 
an adversary. He was large and pos-, 
sessed sufficient physical power to 
have accomplished his purpose, 
"But aside from all other consider-
ations the prosecutrix testified 
that, after her feeble resistance, 
unhindered and alone, she walked 
forth from the dance room without 
molestation she spoke the words 
that cleared defendant of a feloey." 
The evidence adduced by the State 
in the present case~ taken in its most 
damaging sense against the defendant 
might justify a finding that the defen-
dant desired to have sexual intercourse 
if i1e could have gained Carol Lipsey's 
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-consent but this is entirely foreign to 
any intent on his part to commit the 
crime of rape. 
Point 2 
THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW ERRORED IN 
REFUSING TO ARREST JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND 
THAT THE INFORlVIATION FILED BY THE STATE 
AND THE CONDUCT OF THE STATE DURING THE 
COURSE OF THE TRIAL DID NOT APPRISE THE 
DEFENDANT OF THE PARTICULAR CRIME WITH 
WHICH HE WAS CHARGED AND THE RECORD GIVES 
NO INDICATION OF THE PARTICULAR CRifJfE OF 
WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED. 
After the trial of Delbert W~ters 
had closed and the Court had found him 
guilty of the crime of assault with in-
tent to rape as charged but before judg-
ment had been pronounced and the defend-
ant was sentenced 3 the defendant moved 
to arrest judgment on the ground that 
the information filed by the State and 
the conduct of the State during the 
course of the trial did not apprise the 
defendant of the particular crime with 
which he was charged. During the process 
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of the trial two 
separate offenses of the same nature 
were attempted to be shown. The State 
did not elect to prosecute one offense 
or the other. Each alleged offense was 
argued before the Court and the defen-
dant was found guilty of the charge made 
in the information. No finding was made 
as to the separate offenses. The defen-
dant was thereby tried without having 
been given proper notice and was preju-
diced in that he was unable to make a 
proper defense. Defendant is further 
prejudiced because he is unable to de -
termine from the ~record which alleged 
offense he was found guilty of commit-
ting. 
The information charged Delbert 
Waters with n>l".llnitting th~·.~ crime of 
assaulting Miss Carol Lipsey, with the 
intent to commit rape on the lst day of 
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August, 1951. Counsel for the State at 
the opening of the trial against the de-
rendant waived its opening statement and 
proceeded to call the State's first witl 
ness. The prosecution then went on to 
show two separate incidents on the morn-
ing of the lst of August, 1951, and it 
relied upon both for conviction. The 
prosecution first put on evidence con -
cerning the first time Delbert W ~.ters 
and Garry Dickinson were at the home of 
C':>rol Lipsey. (Tr. 8; Tr. 26-27) a t 
which time defendant made advances to-
ward Miss Lipsey. He patted her on the 
head, called her "blondie 'i and later fol-
lowed her into the bedroom, put his arms 
around her and then pushed her down on 
the bed. Garry Dickinson then came into 
the room and took hold of defendant and 
said, "Come on 1 t I II e s go. Defendant 
then went into the other room and sat 
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down. 
The prosecution later put on evi-
dence in regard to the second time the 
defendant was in Miss Lipsey's home on 
the morning of August 1, 1951. (Tr. 9-
15) The testimony was that he came into 
the house while Miss Lipsey was asleep 
and got in bed with her. He put his arms 
around her and started to feel her per -
son, Miss Lipsey finally took hold of 
his hands and caused him to stop. He 
then went to sleep and continued to 
sleep until the Sheriff came to the house 
and took him into custody. 
The State at no time elected to re-
ly upon one or the other of these acts 
for a conviction. The prosecution waived 
~tsvopening statement of the case and in 
addition it also waived its right toooke 
a closing statement. 
When the prosecution argued the de-
37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fendant's motion for a directed verdict 
at the close of the State's case, coun-
sel argued that either or both incidents 
were sufficient to sustain a convi tion. 
The Court made the general finding that 
Delbert Waters wes guilty of the crime 
as charged. It is, therefore, impossi-
~le to detarmine from the record which 
incident was the bas is for the. cr:!.me for 
which Delbert W3.ters was convicted. 
This Court in the early leading 
case of State v. Hilberg 61 P. 215, con-
sidered facts where the defendant had 
been charged with having had unlawful 
sexual intercourse with a female over 
the age of 13 and under the age of 18 
years. The prosecution put into evi-
dence several acts of intercourse during 
a 14 months period. In reversing the 
case the following la!1guage tt-ras used: 
Pg 216. "The trial court permitted 
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the prosecution to introduce six 
distinct acts or crimes to be shown 
in evidence before the jury as hav-
ing occurred in 1897 and 1898~ dur-
ing a period of 14 months, without 
requiring·any election to be made 
and allowed the case to go to the 
jury upon all the several acts of 
sexual intercourse shown, when only 
one act was or could be charged 
against the defendant. Such a 
course was calculated to confound ~ 
distract, and confuse the defendant 
in his defense. He was expected to 
meet one charge at a specified time 
but was required to defend agains~ 
and meet six different acts occur-
ring during a period of 14 months , 
upon one of which the jury were 
asked to convict_ Whether the jury 
united in a verdict upon each act _, 
or s orne on. __ one and others on anoth-
er of the acts proved is problemat-
ical. The course pursued subjected 
the defendant to the risk of con-
viction upon siX charges occurring 
at different times and places, a-
gainst which he could not be ex-
pected to be prepared to defend ~ 
and yet a conviction or acquittal 
upon one would be no bar to a fut-
ure prosecution of any except th e 
first act shm~n. No jury should be 
set to fishing or hunting for a 
charge which they are called upon 
to try. Such a course deprived the 
defendant of a fair trial, and com-
pelled him, without warning, to de-
fend against acts of which he had 
no notice. Manifestly.. he could 
not be prepared to meet such confu-
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said: 
sing charges not contained in the 
information. 
In thesame opinion the Court later 
"No election having been made by 
the prosecution, the law made the 
election. wbat before this had 
been uncertain and contingent was 
now fixed and definite. This elec-
tion having been thus made by prov-
ing the first act of intercourse as 
having taken place in April, 1897 , 
no subsequent election could be 
made) nor could the prosecution 
prove any other act of the kind as 
a substantial offense upon which a 
conviction could be had; but it 
could prove the intimacy and impro-
per relations of the parties prior 
to the acts shown in the month of 
April, 1897J but not afterwards . 
Where the information contains sev-
eral counts charging distinct of-
fenses~ then it is competent and 
the duty of the prosecution, to 
make its election at or before the 
close of its case." 
In the California case of People v. 
Martinez, 208 P. 170 which considered 
the problem under discussion it was sa~: 
"The district attorney did not make 
the election which the law requires 
of him. Neither did the courts 
when the case went to the jury~ di-
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rect the jurors' minds to any par-
ticular act of intercourse with an 
instruction that it was incumbent 
upon the prosecution to establish 
that act by evidence beyond a reas-
onable doubt before a verdict of 
guilty could be returned against 
the defendant. The court's failure 
so to instruct the jury was error, 
notwithstanding defendant's neglect 
to deMand that the district attor-
ney make an election." 
The Califoxn ia court then declared 
the error non-prejudicial, but it failed 
to consider the question of how the de -
fense of res judacata could be settled 
if the prosecution should elect to again 
try the defendant on a selected offense 
which had already been put into evidence 
at the trial below. We quote the lang-
uage of the court because it follows the 
general and established rule that some 
election must be made in such cases by 
the prosecuting attorney or there must 
be an election by law. 
Laycock v. People_ 182 · P. 880, a 
Colorado case discusses the problem as 
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follows: 
"That the selection should be made 
before defendant is compelled to 
proceed with his defense all authw 
orities agree;but whether it should 
be made before the people introduce 
any evidence or at the close of the 
people's case~ or during the prog--
ress of the trial, if other trans-
actions ~re developed, the authori-
ties do not seem to be in harmony . 
The matter rests largely in the 
discretion of the trial court, and 
in most cases it would be better 
for the court to permit the evi-
dence to proceed far enough to id -
entify the transaction upon whi~ 
the people rely for a conviction 
before compelling a selection." 
The authorities appear to be united 
on the holding that at &me time during 
the course of the trial an election must 
be made by the prosecution where there 
is proof of more than one offense brought 
into the evidence under a crimina 1 
charge. If no election is made at any 
time by the prosecution~ the Utah case, 
State v. Hilberg, supra, appears to hold 
that an election must be made as a mat-
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ter of law by the court. The first in-
cident or offense which is put into evi-
dence by the prosecution becomes the 
sole offense upon which it can rely for 
conviction. Here the defendant, Delbert 
Waters, was prejudiced by the uncertain-
ty of the basis of his conviction and 
the considerations leading to it. He 
was not fairly and justly tried as he 
could not properly prepare a defense to 
a charge that was never brought into the 
trial openly and allowed to be refuted 
by the defendant. In the State's case 
against the defendant, the State's at-
torneys ~ere allowed to argue two sepa -
rate offenses as being the basis for a 
single conviction. The court found the 
defendant guilty as charged but there 
was no finding as to which incident the 
court had based its decision upon. The 
judgment of the court does not show What 
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offense the defendant was convicted of 
committing and could not be used alone 
to support the defense of res judicata 
if the State should elect to try the de-
fendant again on either of the two inci-
dents or offenses. 
If the court did consider the first 
incident put into evidence a the basis 
for the conviction. it should be noted 
that the evidence regarding it does not 
tend to show the necessary criminal in-
tent which must be shown by the St!:te. 
The evidence regarding the first inci-
dent was so equivocal that it cannot sus-
tain the conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The finding of the lower court that 
the defendant was guilty of the crime of 
assault with intent to rape is contrary 
to the evidence adduced during the course 
of the trial. 
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In addition, the defendant was de-
nied a fair trial in thet the prosecu-
tion was allowed to put on evidence of 
two separate offenses and at no time was 
required to elect and rely upon one of -
fense or the other for a conviction. The 
defendant t.Tas thereby prejudiced in that 
•. 
he could not make a proper defense to 
the action against him and is now further 
prejudiced in that he cannot show the 
specific offense for which he was tried 
and convicted as a bar to any future 
prosecutions for the same offense. 
In view of the lack of evidence to 
sustain the conviction, and the error 
committed in the trj_al court which de-
~: "". :~ ·~· ·:·i 
prived the defendant or a fair trialj 
the defendant respectfully urges thi s 
court to reverse the judgment of convic-
tion, or in the alternative to grant him. 
a new trial. 
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...... 
Respectfully submitted, 
Tex R. Olsen. 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
2l~ CPA Building. 
Richfieldll Utah. 
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